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NOTE
BENEFIT CORPORATIONS:
A PROPOSAL FOR ASSESSING LIABILITY IN
BENEFIT ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS
Jaime Leet
INTRODUCTION
There has been a growing trend of more socially conscious
consumption as a new generation of consumers and business
leaders rises to the forefront. This trend has elicited a response
from existing corporations and entrepreneurs starting new
businesses such that socially-minded goals are taken into ac-
count in addition to profit-maximizing goals. Because the
traditional corporation models restricted the ability of busi-
nesses to serve both socially-conscious and profit-maximizing
goals simultaneously, new "fourth sector" corporations that
combine aspects of the traditional for-profit, non-profit, and
government sectors have been increasing in number. The most
notable of these "fourth sector" corporations are benefit corpo-
rations, which are for-profit entities that claim to serve a gen-
eral public benefit. Since the benefit corporation was first
recognized in Maryland in 2010, it has garnered much criti-
cism. Some argue that the new entity does not do enough to
enhance the general public welfare, whereas others argue that
the new corporate form is unnecessary to achieve beneficial
goals. There appears to be a consensus, however, that crucial
issues exist in the regulation of benefit corporations that the
courts have not yet had the opportunity to address. One of
these issues is the difficulty in assessing and enforcing the
socially-conscious goals that benefit corporations claim to pro-
mote. This Note discusses the existing benefit corporation de-
bate in four parts: Part I introduces the rise of the benefit
corporation and its recent trends; Part II assesses the advan-
t B.A., Cornell University, 2014; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2018; Articles
Editor, Comell Law Review, Vol. 103. I am grateful to the members of the Cornell
Law Review for their hard work in publishing this Note. Special thanks to Julia
Bensur and Professor Pierrick Le Goff for taking the time to review this Note, as
well as Professor Chris Kim and the Cornell Chamber & Symphony Orchestras for
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tages of the benefit corporation; Part III considers its current
limitations; and Part IV suggests a method of addressing the
ambiguity in evaluating director liability in benefit enforcement
proceedings.
I
THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
A. Background
As a new generation infiltrates the workforce, the market
economy is beginning to increasingly depend on variables other
than the desire for financial gain. No longer are key market
players such as consumers, investors, and employees making
decisions without regard to the larger implications of their ac-
tions. A Nielsen survey published in 2015 indicates that 66
percent of global survey respondents are willing to pay more for
products that are socially responsible. This figure has in-
creased from 55 percent in 2014 and 50 percent in 2013.1
Similarly, the 2010 Cone Cause Evolution Study indicates
that 80 percent of respondents would likely choose a brand
that supports a cause over one that does not, given that both
are similar in price and quality.2 These figures show that con-
sumers are increasingly considering a company's socially and
environmentally conscious endeavors when making choices.3
Social media likely plays a large role in shaping this trend, as
consumers and employees are able to share information about
a commodity's production processes and origins with ease.
This undoubtedly has heightened the public's awareness of
social missions that are pursuing goals such as environmental
1 Sustainable Selections: How Socially Responsible Companies Are Turning a
Profit, NIELSEN: NEWSWIRE (Oct. 12, 2015), http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/in-
sights/news/2015/sustainable-selections-how-socially-responsible-companes-
are-turning-a-profit.html [https://perma.cc/TX3P-CFV7]. Another study con-
ducted by BBMG indicates that 73 percent of consumers care about the company
who made the product, and not just the product itself. Jo Confino, Consumers
Believe Brands Can Have Positive Impact but Are Failing to Do So, THE GUARDIAN
(June 4, 2013, 1:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/
consumers-brands-positive-impact-failing [https://perma.cc/TY9Q-ZBNE].
2 CONE LLC, 2010 CONE CAUSE EVOLUTION STUDY 6, http://www.conecomm
.com/research-blog/20 10-cause-evolution-study [https://perma.ce/LJ86-
EAYF].
3 See Legal FAQS, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/
files/documents/Implications ofBecoming_aDE_Public BenefiltCorporation_0
.pdf [https://perma.cc/GW3N-SMQVI [hereinafter Legal FAQSI (noting that
"[n]early 70 Million U.S. consumers state a preference for making purchasing
decisions based upon their sense of a company's social and environmental
responsibility").
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sustainability, gender equality, and improved working
conditions.4
Perhaps in response to this trend, the business world has
begun to shift its strategies for business success in the long
run.5 Many companies are showing increases in cash and non-
cash charitable investments and pro bono hours, which indi-
cates a greater focus on social-oriented investment.6 Compa-
nies are also beginning to recognize that public reputation
makes a significant impact not only on consumer product
choices but also on the acquisition of talent.7 According to
Benefitcorp.net, Millennials, who comprise 50 percent of the
global workforce, prefer work with meaning.8 A recent survey
published by Deloitte also states that the overwhelming major-
ity of Millennials believe that "the success of a business should
be measured in terms of more than just its financial
performance."9
Given this rising focus on corporate responsibility, busi-
nesses are recognizing the need for adjustment in order to at-
tract and retain talent among Millennials. 10 Reflecting this
growing trend and shift in Millennial mindset, a new corporate
entity called the benefit corporation emerged in 2010.
4 See COMM. ENCOURAGING CORP. PHILANTHROPY, GIVING IN NUMBERs 2 (2015),
http://cecp.co/wp-content/uploads/2016/11 /GIN2015_FINALweb-1.pdf?redi
rect=NO [https://perma.cc/CN9Y-UFFE] ("IToday's instantaneous, transparent,
and hyper-connected exchange of data has spawned a new reality. In a world
where all stakeholders-cust6mers, neighbors, regulators, and shareholders-
can see inside the enterprise, leaders in the corporate sector have committed to an
enlightened self-interest in societal investment.").
5 A market has emerged for providing consulting services to companies aim-
ing for socially responsible branding and growth. See, e.g., Aspirational Consum-
ers Are Rising. Are Brands Ready to Meet Them?, GLOBESCAN (June 6, 2016),
https://www.globescan.com/component/content/article/ 103-press-releases-
2016/390-aspirational-consumers-are-rising-are-brands-ready-to-meet-
them.html [https://perma.cc/396V-ZPLR] (stating that BBMG's purpose is to
"creat[e] brands of enduring value ... and re-engineer brand experiences to drive
growth and positive social impact"). See also SUSTAINABLE BRANDS; http://
www.sustainablebrands.com/ [https://perma.cc/Q8GD-X6XL] (focusing on en-
hancing sustainability to promote long-term growth).
6 COMM. ENCOURAGING CORP. PHILANTHROPY, supra note 4, at 5.
7 See Legal FAQS, supra note 3.
8 Id.
9 Millennials Want Business to Shift Its Purpose: The Deloitte Millennial Sur-
vey 2016, DELOITE, 8 https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/about-de
loitte/articles/gx-millennials-shifting-business-purpose.html [https://perma.cc/
G8VE-3AZD].
10 See id. (reporting that "[blusinesses must adjust how they nurture loyalty
among Millennials or risk losing a large percentage of their workforces").
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B. The Hybrid Business Model
Millennial survey results such as Deloitte's make sense in
light of the values that Millennials and hybrid business forms,
or firms that merge aspects of for-profit and non-profit organi-
zations, share.11 For example, both appear to strive for au-
thenticity in representing who they are. 12 To illustrate,
Millennials have been fighting the need to follow previous gen-
erations' binary social constructs such as gender norms and
instead have shown a proclivity towards more fluid bounda-
ries.1 3 Similarly, hybrid organizations have embraced the idea
that social and economic goals can fall on a spectrum rather
than being black and white. 1 4
The idea of forming a hybrid between a non-profit and for-
profit business organization garnered public attention with the
founding of B Lab, a non-profit organization that started a
movement to promote a "triple bottom line" approach for busi-
nesses constituting "profit, people and planet."15 The move-
ment paved the way for the concept of the benefit corporation
to gain legal recognition.1 6 The benefit corporation was first
adopted as a new kind of corporate entity by Maryland in
2010.17 This new model was created to merge the traditional
for-profit business corporation model with a non-profit model
by allowing social entrepreneurs to consider interests beyond
those of maximizing shareholder wealth in order to promote a
cause that provides a general benefit to the public.18 Cur-
11 Chris Miller, Millennials and Hybrid Legal Structures Are Here to Stay,
STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV. (July 1, 2016), https://ssr.org/articles/entry/millen
nials-and-hybrid_1egal-structures are heretostay [https://perma.cc/8ARU-N
83P].
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 IcL
15 Josh Patrick, Assessing the Benefits of Becoming a Benefit Corporation,
N.Y. TIMES: YOU'RE THE Boss (June 13, 2014, 1:00 PM), http://boss.blogs.nytimes.
com/2014/06/13/assessing-the-benefits-of-a-benefit-corporation/ [https://
perma.cc/L2FN-GGQG].
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Noam Noked, Benefit Corporations vs. "Regular" Corporations: A Harmful
Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (May 13, 2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-regular-
corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy/ [https://perma.cc/9UDQ-875N (stating
that advocates of the benefit corporation claim that it "fills a gap between tradi-
tional corporations and non-profits by giving social entrepreneurs flexibility to
achieve the dual objectives of doing well and doing good").
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rently, 33 states have passed benefit corporation legislation,
and six states are working on passing legislation. 19
In the early 20th century, courts imposed a responsibility
on directors of corporations to consider shareholder wealth
above stakeholder interests. 20 The theory behind imposing
such a responsibility can be summed up by Milton Friedman's
quote: "The social responsibility of business is to increase its
profits."2 1 This sentiment did not prevail in all circumstances,
however. For example, courts have been reluctant to find di-
rectors liable for decisions pertaining to the day-to-day opera-
tion of the business.22 Moreover, a number of states have
passed non-shareholder constituency statutes. 23 Such stat-
utes give directors of corporations the authority to consider
interests beyond maximizing shareholder wealth.2 4 Nonethe-
less, these statutes often fail to clarify to what extent directors
are allowed to consider stakeholder interests at the expense of
shareholder interests.2 5
Although many states have adopted constituency statutes
that permit directors to consider the interests of groups beyond
shareholders, the threat of litigation likely chills directors of
traditional for-profit corporations from considering non-share-
holder interests alongside financial concerns when making cor-
porate decisions.2 6 Shareholders, depending on the state, have
the right to file direct or derivative actions on behalf of a corpo-
ration for a director's breach of fiduciary duty.2 7 For example,
in states such as New York, shareholders may file a derivative
19 State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP.NET, [http://
benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/WRZ7-
HQ6J] [hereinafter State by State Status].
20 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Stat-
utes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 976-77 (1992) (explaining how the Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co. decision imposed on directors a duty to maximize shareholder wealth).
21 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
22 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 973-74.
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 See WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 9-10 (2013), http://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/BenefitCorporation WhitePaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/K8VM-NULW].
27 See Michael Smith & Bethany Rezek, Director Fiduciary Duties: Owed to the
Corporation or the Shareholders?, KING & SPALDING (Jan. 22, 2014), https://
www.kslaw.com/blog-posts/director-fiduciary-duties-owed-corporation-share-
holders [https://perma.cc/G9T9-R2RT].
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suit against corporate directors for a breach of fiduciary duty.28
In other states, such as Delaware, shareholders may fie a de-
rivative suit or a direct suit, depending on whether the corpora-
tion or the shareholders suffered injury and whether the
corporation or the shareholders would receive the benefit of
any recovery.29 The possible chilling effect is particularly prob-
lematic in Delaware, where over 50 percent of all publically
traded companies are domiciled,30 because Delaware lacks
such a constituency statute.3 1
The effect of lacking a constituency statute can be seen in
eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, where the Delaware
Court of Chancery held that directors are obligated to maximize
shareholder value.32 eBay follows the landmark case, Revlon,
Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., where the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that when a sale of a company is
inevitable, the directors of the corporation acquire "Revlon du-
ties"3 3 that require the corporation to be sold to the highest
bidder.3 4 Because many state courts look to Delaware case law
when resolving corporate disputes (given that Delaware has the
most developed case law in this area),35 Delaware decisions
such as eBay and Revlon have fostered an environment where
directors of traditional for-profit corporations are likely to feel
heavily pressured to prioritize the financial interests of share-
holders above alternative interests, regardless of whether the
corporation is domiciled in a state having a constituency
statute.3 6
28 E.g., Bank of Am. Corp. v. Lemgruber, 385 F. Supp. 2d 200, 224 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
29 Smith, supra note 27.
30 Div. of Corps., About Agency, STATE OF DELAWARE, http://corp.delaware
.gov/aboutagency.shtml [https://perma.cc/NDB4-92FG.
31 CIARK & VRANKA, supra note 26, at 9-10.
32 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34-35 n.105 (Del.
Ch. 2010) ("Although such considerations [of non-stockholder corporate constitu-
encies and interests] may be permissible, there are fundamental limitations upon
that prerogative. A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharg-
ing its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to
the stockholders." (quoting Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
506 A.2d 173, 183 (Del. 1986)).
33 William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations Are.
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817,
837 (2012).
34 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
35 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out
Who's Opting In?, 14 U.C. DAvIS Bus. L.J. 247, 248 n.3 (2013).
36 But see Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 996 (stating that it is likely that
directors use non-shareholder constituency statutes to disguise actions made in
their own self-interest).
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The benefit corporation is an attempt to remedy this prob-
lem by requiring directors to consider interests beyond those
that are purely financial in nature.37 Thirty-three states have
passed statutes recognizing the benefit corporation as a new
business form.3 8 Most of the statutes were modeled after the
Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, which states that the
purpose of a benefit corporation is to pursue a "general public
benefit."3 9 The model legislation defines a general public bene-
fit as a "material positive impact on society and the environ-
ment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corpo-
ration." 40 Unlike constituency statutes, the model benefit leg-
islation requires, rather than simply permits, directors to
consider general public benefits when making decisions.4 1
Moreover, the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation states that
benefit corporations are permitted to identify specific benefit
purposes and lists seven potential categories that these bene-
fits may fall under:
(1) [Piroviding low-income or underserved individuals or
communities with beneficial products or services;
(2) [Piromoting economic opportunity for individuals or com-
munities beyond the creation of jobs in the normal course of
business;
(3) [Pirotecting or restoring the environment;
(4) [Ilmproving human health;
(5) [Plromoting the arts, sciences, or advancement of
knowledge;
(6) [IIncreasing the flow of capital to entities with a purpose
to benefit society or the environment; [or]
(7) [Clonferring any other particular benefit on society or the
environment. 42
Nevertheless, the degree to which a benefit corporation
should heed these socially beneficial interests relative to the
financial interests of its shareholders is a source of recent de-
37 Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION
REv., Summer 2012, at 51, 53 (stating that "[tihe Benefit Corporation is a corpo-
rate form . .. that requires organizations to consider a designated social purpose
and corresponding social impact alongside financial analysis in making strategic
and tactical business decisions").
38 State by State Status, supra note 19.
39 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGISLATION § 201(a) (version of Apr. 4, 2016), http://
benefitcorp.net/sites/default/ffles/Model%2Benefit%2OCorp%20Legislation_4
16.pdf [http://perma.cc/5ZFM-KBM8] [hereinafter MBCL].
40 Id. § 102.
41 Id. § 301.
42 Id. § 102.
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bate.4 3 There is still a lack of clarity with regards to how to
balance these competing interests because courts have yet to
provide explicit guidance on this issue.4 4
Most states that recognize benefit corporations as a new
corporate form have modeled their respective legislation after
the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation or Delaware's legisla-
tion.45 The Delaware benefit corporation statute uses slightly
different language than the Model Benefit Corporation. In Del-
aware, the benefit corporation model requires directors to
weigh the interests of stakeholders "materially affected by the
corporation's conduct" in addition to the financial interests of
shareholders.4 6 Benefit corporations in Delaware are formally
entitled "public benefit corporations" (PBCs) and are subject to
the requirement to provide its shareholders with a public bene-
fit report at least once every two years. 4 7 Under the Delaware
statute, the statement must include: (1) the objectives the com-
pany's board of directors has established to promote the public
benefit; (2) the standards the board of directors has adopted to
measure the progress of the benefit; (3) objective factual infor-
mation regarding the company's progress in reaching the
stated objectives; and (4) an assessment of the corporation's
success in meeting the stated objectives.48 Additionally, a PBC
is required to list in its certificate of incorporation at least one
or more specific public benefits that the corporation seeks to
promote.4 9
Although the Delaware statute lays the groundwork for the
information that benefit corporations must provide to their
shareholders, it does not indicate how these reports should be
reviewed for accuracy. Rather, it states that a benefit corpora-
tion may use a third-party standard or certification to assess
the corporation's claims if the corporation's certificate of incor-
poration or bylaws require it to do so. 5 0 In other words, Dela-
ware does not require benefit corporations to have their claims
43 This issue is discussed in more detail in Part II.
44 CIARK & VRANKA, supra note 26, at 10 ("[Tihe lack of case law interpreting
constituency statutes, coupled with the context in which many of these statutes
were enacted, makes it difficult for directors to know exactly how, when and to
what extent they can consider those interests.").
45 J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report of Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV.
25, 41 (2015) ("[Mlost states have mostly gravitated toward either the Delaware
framework or the Model Benefit Corporation framework.").
46 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2017).
47 Id. § 366(b).
48 IJL
49 Id. § 362(a)(1).
5o Id. § 366(a)(c)(3).
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measured against an objective third-party standard or to make
their reports public.5 1 This contrasts with the Model Benefit
Legislation, which requires benefit corporations to generate a
report annually, make the report public, and have the report
assessed by a third party.5 2 Moreover, while directors of Dela-
ware PBCs are not subject to duties to any individual person,
shareholders have the potential to bring derivative suits.5 3 Ad-
ditionally, benefit corporations currently do not enjoy any state
or federal tax benefits.54
II
ADVANTAGES OF THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
A. Raising Capital
Raising capital is one of the first and most important steps
an entrepreneur must take before forming a successful busi-
ness.55 Compared to organizations that seek to support a so-
cial mission through a non-profit model, the benefit
corporation is at a significant advantage in terms of raising
capital.5 6 For example, non-profits have difficulty obtaining
loans from banks and private investors and thus must spend
resources attempting to secure capital from private donors.5 7
In contrast, the for-profit benefit corporation allows entrepre-
neurs to attract investors, albeit less easily than their more
traditional for-profit counterparts.5 8 Private investors and
banks may charge higher interest rates to benefit corporations
for fear that the social mission makes profitability less
certain.59
51 The supposed reasons for this lack of a third-party standard requirement
are discussed and analyzed in Part II.
52 MBCL, supra note 39, § 102.
53 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2017).
54 The city of Philadelphia, however, has granted tax breaks to B Corps.
Evangeline Gomez, The Rise of the Charitable For-Profit Entity, FORBES (Jan. 13,
2012, 6:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/evangelinegomez/2012/01/13/
the-rise-of-the-charitable-for-profit-entity [http://perma.cc/GER7-DTHE].
55 See Murray Newlands, 5 Steps Entrepreneurs Should Take Before Seeking
Investment, FORBEs (June 18, 2015, 6:47 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
nmewlands/2015/06/18/5-steps-entrepreneurs-should-take-before-seeking-in-
vestment [http://perrna.cc/8MD5-7AFE].
56 Steven Munch, Improving the Benefit Corporation: How Traditional Govern-
ance Mechanisms Can Enhance the Innovative New Business Form, 7 Nw. J.L. &
Soc. Pot'Y 170, 173 (2012).
57 Id. at 174.
58 ICL
59 Id.
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In addition, benefit corporations have the option of going
public.60 The first benefit corporation to go public was Laure-
ate Education, Inc., which is the largest global network of on-
line higher education and which registered for its IPO in late
2015.61 According to the founder and CEO of Laureate, the
company decided to register as a benefit corporation "so IPO
investors will know that [Laureate] takes its social mission
seriously."62
B. Reputation
Another business advantage of the benefit corporation in-
volves the corporation's reputation. Here, it is important to
note the difference between benefit corporations and certified B
Corporations (B Corps).63 Whereas a B Corp refers to a com-
pany that has received a certification of meeting higher stan-
dards of accountability and transparency by a non-profit
company called B Lab, a benefit corporation is a new type of
legal entity.64 B Lab does, however, require all certified B
Corps incorporated in a state having a benefit corporation stat-
ute to elect to become a benefit corporation within four years of
the first effective date of the legislation.6 5
Both benefit corporations and B Corps have the advantage
of being able to promote themselves as social-mission-driven or
socially responsible corporations, which undoubtedly adds
positive value to a corporation's marketability-both for con-
60 FAQ, BENEFITCORP.NET, [hereinafter FAQ] http://benefitcorp.net/faq
[https://perma.cc/JCE4-Q7KA].
61 Brad Edmondson, The First Benefit Corporation IPO is Coming, and That's a
Big Deal, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.triplepundit.com/2016/02/
first-benefit-corporation-ipo-coming-thats-big-deal/ [https://perma.cc/PF2V-
WJLS.
62 Jd.
63 For a side-by-side comparison, see Benefit Corporations & Certified B
Corps, BENEFITcoRP.NET, http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/benefit-corporations-
and-certified-b-corps [https://perma.cc/4G82-6ERA]; see also Katherine R. Lofft,
Purvi B. Maniar & Tamar R. Rosenberg, Are Hybrids Really More Efficient? A
'Drive-By' Analysis ofAlternative Company Structures, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept. 2012,
at 1, http://www.ebglaw.com/content/uploads/2014/06/53119_Lofft-Maniar-
Rosenberg-ABA-Business-Law-Today-Hybrid-Structures.pdf [https://perma.cc/
KHW9-EB5P] (also discussing differences between the two corporate forms).
64 How to Become a Benefit Corporation, BENEFITCORP.NET, http://benefitcorp.
net/businesses/how-become-benefit-corporation [https://perma.cc/87B4-
PF56]; About B Lab, B IAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/
about-b-lab [https://perma.cc/87B4-PF56].
65 Corporation Legal Roadmap, B LAB), https://www.bcorporation.net/be-
come-a-b-corp/how-to-become-a-b-corp/legal-roadmap/corporation-legal-
roadmap [https://perma.cc/TFF8-6UKF].
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sumers and potential employees.6 6 While the public might as-
sociate for-profit corporations with the creation of negative
externalities, benefit corporations have the advantage of draw-
ing in consumers with the promise to create positive externali-
ties. 6 7 The demand for corporate responsibility among
consumers and employees will likely continue to grow, and the
benefit corporation allows entrepreneurs to cater to this rising
demand and to differentiate themselves from owners of more
traditional for-profit corporations.6 8
C. Aligning Interests
At the same time, the benefit corporation model and B
Corps give a voice to the collective effort towards higher stan-
dards for corporate responsibility. 69 The more widespread rec-
ognition of these socially responsible organizations has been a
catalyst for bringing like-minded business leaders together in
recent years. 70 This phenomenon was one of the reasons be-
hind crowdfunding platform Kickstarter's change from a for-
profit structure to a benefit corporation.7 1 As co-founder and
CEO of Kickstarter Yancey Strickler states, the benefit corpora-
tion structure is "a powerful one for aligning people around a
goal."7 2 Additionally, readily available tools such as the B Lab
Impact Assessment, which provides a free way to measure so-
66 See Kent Greenfield, A Skeptic's View of Benefit Corporations, 1 EMoRY
CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILIY REV. 17, 17 (2014) ("[There's a growing body
of evidence . . . that the companies that are most successful at maximizing
shareholder value over time are those that aim toward goals other than maximiz-
ing shareholder value. Employees and customers often know more about and
have more of a long-term commitment to a company than shareholders do."
(quoting Justin Fox & Jay W. Lorsch, What Good Are Shareholders?, 90 HARV.
Bus. REV. 49, 57 (2012))).
67 See Battilana et al., supra note 37, at 3 (stating that hybrid corporate
models seek to exploit these positive externalities).
68 See Doug Bend & Alex King, Why Consider a Benefit Corporation?, FORBES
(May 30, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theyec/2014/05/30/
why-consider-a-benefit-corporation [https://perma.cc/LA7A-LR2K] ("[Tihe de-
mand for corporate accountability is at an all-time high, with many consumers
already aligning their purchases with their values. The benefit corporation status
is a great way to differentiate your company from the competition and capitalize
on these customers.").
69 Ryan Honeyman, Has the B Corp Movement Made a Difference? A Look at
the Progress of the B Corporation Movement to Date, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV.
(Oct. 13, 2014), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/has the_b_corp-movement_
made_a_difference [https://perma.cc/9X22-XMCF].
70 Id.
71 Catherine Clifford, Kickstarter CEO: Why We're a Benefits Corporation, Not
a Nonprofit, ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/arti-
cle/250935 [https://perma.cc/35EV-K5DQI.
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cial and environmental impacts of a corporation, offer easy
ways for business leaders to strive towards common goals. 73
D. Liability
As previously mentioned, benefit corporations also enjoy
the legal benefit of being explicitly permitted to consider stake-
holder interests in addition to shareholder interests.74 Direc-
tors of traditional for-profit corporations are held to a duty of
care, which obligates the board of directors to choose opera-
tional measures that maximize shareholder wealth.7 5 The
Michigan Supreme Court discussed this rule in Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co.7 6 In that case, defendant Ford Motor Co., a car man-
ufacturer, engaged in business practices that pursued miscel-
laneous goals at the expense of shareholder wealth.7 7 Ford had
gradually lowered the price of its cars from over $900 to $440
with the intention of spreading to the public the benefits of
owning a motor vehicle.7 8 In 1916, the company also decided
to stop paying special dividends in order to fund a new manu-
facturing plant with a higher production capacity and to in-
crease employee salaries.79 Although adopted in pursuit of
altruistic goals, Ford's business practices caused a decrease in
short-term profits and dramatically impacted special divi-
dends.8 0 In response, shareholders brought an action against
Ford to challenge its business decisions. Specifically, the
plaintiff shareholders asked the court to require Ford Motor Co.
to distribute accumulated cash surplus to shareholders and to
enjoin the company from building a new manufacturing
plant.8 ' The Court explained the duty to shareholders that
directors must meet:
A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily
for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of directors is
to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and
does not extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction
73 See Honeyman, supra note 69.
74 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2017) (allowing the corporation to
weigh the interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct).
75 Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 976.
76 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919).
77 Id. at 670-72
78 Id. at 670-73.
79 Id. at 670-71.
80 Id.
81 JIC
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of profits, or to the nondistribution of profits among stock-
holders in order to devote them to other purposes.8 2
The court thus reaffirmed that the primary role as a director is
to work towards the enhancement of shareholder profits. De-
spite this duty to shareholders, however, the court explained
that directors should be given ample discretion to make day-to-
day business decisions. The court stated:
There is committed to the discretion of directors, a discretion
to be exercised in good faith, the infinite details of business,
including the wages which shall be paid to [employees], the
number of hours they shall work, the conditions under which
labor shall be carried on, and the price for which products
shall be offered to the public.8 3
The idea that the board of directors should be entrusted with
the authority to make business decisions based on its own best
judgment is embodied in what is now referred to as the busi-
ness judgment rule.84 This rule is "a judicially created doctrine
that protects directors from personal liability for decisions
made in their capacity as a director, so long as certain disquali-
fying behaviors are not established."8 5 Accordingly, the court
in Dodge refused to interfere with the decisions that the direc-
tors of Ford Motor Company made in the conducting of its
business-namely, reducing the price of its cars and choosing
to expand its manufacturing base.8 6
In Dodge and subsequent cases, courts have shown that
they are in practice likely to defer to the discretion of directors
in deciding operational matters.8 7 The business judgment rule
thus shields directors from having their business decisions
heavily scrutinized by judges who likely do not share the direc-
tors' expertise and experience in the business realm.8 8 As a
result, directors of traditional for-profit corporations are often
able to make operational decisions encompassing the interests
of stakeholders in addition to shareholders, irrespective of
whether the company is incorporated in a state that has passed
82 Id. at 684.
83 Id.
84 See Lori McMillan, The Business Judgment Rule as an Immunity Doctrine, 4
WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 521, 526-28 (2013) (discussing the business judgment
rule and its history).
85 Id. at 524.
86 Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684.
87 See Bainbridge, supra note 20, at 1022 ("Absent a disabling conflict, courts
generally defer to board decisions.").
88 Id. at 977 (restating the "traditional" idea that "judges are not business
experts").
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a constituency statute.89 Accordingly, the explicit permission
to consider stakeholder interests that benefit corporation sta-
tus gives directors does not provide groundbreaking legal pro-
tections when it comes to operational, or day-to-day
decisions.9 0 Electing to become a benefit corporation does,
however, provide greater legal protection for directors' struc-
tural decision making.9 1
Structural decisions involve matters relating to the
"changes in the ownership structure of the corporation."9 2 An
example of a structural decision is when a director is faced with
defending a takeover attempt.9 3 In such a case, courts gener-
ally give directors less deference than when operational mat-
ters are at hand.94 A leading Delaware case, Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., set guidelines for implicating the business
judgment rule in the case of a takeover attempt.9 5 In Unocal,
the court stated that the business judgment rule applies only
when a legitimate threat is posed to the corporation and when
the directors can show that their response was "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."9 6 This case shows how the courts
apply a stricter standard when reviewing director decisions
that have an impact on the terms of ownership of a corporation.
Thus, directors of for-profit corporations are barred from pur-
suing "purely philanthropic" ends when making structural de-
cisions under the Unocal standard.9 7
In contrast to for-profit models, benefit corporation status
offers protection to directors with regard to their structural
decision making. For example, directors of benefit corpora-
tions will not be held liable for breaching Revlon duties, or their
duty to sell to the highest bidder when sale of the company is
inevitable.9 8 An example of how this phenomenon comes into
play can be seen in the acquisition case of Ben & Jerry's.9 9
89 Id. at 998 (explaining how the board of directors will typically prevail re-
gardless of whether the state has passed a non-shareholder constituency statute).
90 Id. at 975 (stating that "[structural decisions relate to changes in the
ownership structure of the corporation," whereas "[olperational decisions encom-
pass everything else-all of the decisions necessary to run the firm on a continu-
ing basis").
91 hI
92 Id.
93 Clark & Babson, supra note 33, at 836.
94 Id.
95 493 A.2d 946, 953-58 (Del. 1985).
96 Id. at 949, 955-56; see also Clark & Babson, supra note 33, at 836 (ex-
plaining the Unocal rule).
97 See Clark & Babson, supra note 33, at 836.
98 Legal FAQS, supra note 3.
99 Lofft, Maniar & Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 1.
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Though not a benefit corporation, Ben & Jerry's had built a
reputation in the market as a business dedicated to corporate
responsibility through environmental and fair trade initia-
tives. 100 The company also committed to using dairy without
growth hormones, created jobs in low-income areas, and
donated a significant amount of their profits to charity. 10 1
Having developed an image of strong corporate responsibility
and community involvement over the course of twenty years,
the founders of Ben & Jerry's were reluctant to sell their com-
pany to the corporate giant, Unilever.1 0 2 After Ben & Jerry's
denied Unilever's offer, Unilever brought an action against the
ice cream company.103 Unilever prevailed on the grounds that
Ben & Jerry's was under a duty to sell the corporation to the
highest bidder given that a takeover was inevitable.104 In such
a case, having benefit corporation status would have allowed
Ben & Jerry's to avoid having to sell to a company such as
Unilever, which the Ben & Jerry's founders did not believe
would maintain the socially responsible mission that the foun-
ders had built for two decades.105 Thus, as a benefit corpora-
tion, Ben & Jerry's would be able to avoid the Revlon duty and
would instead be under an obligation to consider the social
implications of the sale in addition to the shareholder
interests. 106
E. Psychological Benefits
Beyond business and legal advantages, the benefit corpo-
ration provides the psychological benefit of acting for the public
interest. In their article, A Modigliani-Miller Theory of Altruistic
Corporate Social Responsibility, Joshua Zivin and Arthur Small
refer to this psychological benefit as "warm glow," or the util-
ity' 0 7 individuals receive from "the act of contributing to [the
100 Paula Caligiuri, When Unilever Bought Ben & Jerry's: A Story of CEO Adapt-
ability, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 14, 2012), https://www.fastcompany.com/3000398/
when-unilever-bought-ben-jerrys-story-ceo-adaptability [https://perma.cc/
6SCQ-AXFD].
101 Id.
102 . JL
103 Alden Livingston, To B or Not to B? Weighing the Benefits ofBenefit Corpora-
tions, MASHABLE (Mar. 2, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/03/02/benefit-cor-
porations [https://perma.cc/W29R-RCAA).
104 I
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 For a brief background on the economic theory of utility, see Brian
Duignan & Henry West, Utilitarianism, in ENCYCLOPBBDIA BRITANNICA (2017), https:/
/www.britannica.com/topic/utilitarianism-philosophy [https://perma.cc/
4NMU-LKUE].
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public's] betterment" and the "personal . . . feeling of having
made a difference."10 8 Alicia Plerhoples at Georgetown Univer-
sity Law Center also suggests that "warm glow" results from
outside observers' perception of the charitable work that those
within a benefit corporation perform. 09
According to Zivin and Small, donors do not derive "warm
glow" simply from the act of giving by itself but from giving in
such a way that effectively results in a public benefit.11 0 Thus,
although the act of giving to charitable causes or investing in
socially responsible organizations may give individuals utility,
that utility is correlated to the impact that is being made on
society."' Consequently, in the market for charitable giving,
individuals will seek to use their resources where they will
generate the most utility.112 Whereas a monetary gift to a non-
profit or charitable organization will generate a certain number
of utils"13 for a donor, that same donor would theoretically
derive greater utility from investing in an organization that
achieves the same socially beneficial results as the non-profit
organization while simultaneously generating profit for the in-
vestor.114 In that sense, the benefit corporation can add to the
overall utility that a society enjoys.
Additionally, incorporating as a benefit corporation forces
business leaders to commit to the social mission they strive to
achieve. Behavioral economists would call the benefit corpora-
tion status a "commitment device," or a tool that would keep
directors accountable for continuing to live up to their socially-
108 Joshua Graff Zivin & Arthur Small, A Modigliani-Miller Theory of Altruistic
Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 TOPICs ECON. ANALYSIS & POL'Y 1, 3-4 n.3 (2005)
(emphasis omitted).
109 Alicia E. Plerhoples, Nonprofit Displacement and the Pursuit of Charity
ThroughPublic Benefit Corporations, 21 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 525, 563-64 (2016).
110 See Zivin & Small, supra note 108, at 3-4 n.3.
111 IcL
112 Id. at 2 (explaining that "the market price of warm glow is not zero").
113 A "util" is a microeconomic term used to describe a standard unit of utility,
or the happiness that an individual derives from consumption. For more informa-
tion, see Marc Davis, Microeconomics: Assumptions and Utility, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/microeconomics/
microeconomics2.asp [https://perma.cc/UD9Q-GQEW].
114 Here, the assumption is that: (1) the donor or investor is a rational market
player who desires to maximize his or her utility, (2) the donor or investor views
charitable organizations and businesses as perfect substitutes, and (3) the for-
profit benefit corporation would be able to achieve equivalent results to the non-
profit organization because of the facility with which a for-profit corporation
would obtain financing and loans as compared to a traditional non-profit organi-
zation. See Zivin and Small. supra note 108, at 11.
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minded undertakings even when profits are low.15 While
other for-profit businesses allow directors to hold out on chari-
table giving or sustainable initiatives when business is slow,
directors of benefit corporations are under an explicit obliga-
tion to implement the company's social mission. 1 6 Because of
this, benefit corporation status can serve as a tool for making
sure that companies keep their promises to the public.
In sum, the benefit corporation provides a number of po-
tential advantages, ranging from financial benefits to psycho-
logical benefits, that serve entrepreneurs, directors, investors,
and society. These potential benefits are not without limita-
tions, however, which I will examine in the following section.
III
LIMITATIONS
A. "General Public Benefit"
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation states that a
benefit corporation must cater to a "general public benefit. ""'
Although a number of specific benefits are listed in the legisla-
tion, the model legislation does not require the company to
explicitly state the public benefit that the company will strive to
create.118 The vague language of "general public benefit" gives
corporations significant leeway when electing to become a ben-
efit corporation. For example, a "general public benefit" could
range from something specific, such as committing to contrib-
ute 5% of profits to promote a particular arts education pro-
gram, 1 to something broad, such as promising to promote a
sense of wellbeing for employees in the workplace. Although
115 James Surowiecki, Companies with Benefits, THE NEW YORKER (Aug. 4,
2014), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/companies-benefits
[https://perma.cc/NPF2-U649].
116 See ic. (explaining that shareholders of a benefit corporation can sue its
directors for failure to carry out the company's social mission, "just as they can
sue directors of traditional companies for violating their fiduciary duty").
117 See MBCL, supra note 39, § 102 (defining a "[gleneral public benefit" as "[a]
material positive impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, as-
sessed against a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a
benefit corporation").
118 See generally id.
119 The popular crowdfunding platform, Kickstarter, pledged to annually com-
mit "5% of its after-tax profit towards arts and music education, and to organiza-
tions fighting to end systemic inequality," half of which would be "devoted to arts
and music programs for children and young adults, with a primary focus on
underserved communities in New York City ... distributed to 501(c)(3) organiza-
tions, public schools, or via programs developed by Kickstarter itself." Rick Co-
hen, Kickstarter Becomes a Public Benefit Corporation, So What?, NONPROFIT
QUARTERLY (Sept. 25, 2015), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/2015/09/25/kick
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both commitments undoubtedly lead to positive externalities,
there is a large difference in the scope and specificity of the
social mission.
This large difference could be problematic for a number of
reasons; the most obvious is the potential for companies to
disguise their not-so-socially-conscious business practices as
a benefit corporation. In the context of environmental impacts,
this type of deceit is termed "greenwashing." 12 0 A typical exam-
ple of greenwashing is when an energy company spends a lot of
resources marketing its "green" practices, when in reality,
those practices account for only a small fraction of its overall
"not-so-green" business.1 2 1 Analogously, there is a risk that
corporations claiming a "general public benefit" would be able
to take advantage of benefit corporation status while only tan-
gentially pursuing socially beneficial missions or pursuing
them in a way that results in negligible positive impacts. Ac-
cordingly, benefit corporations have received criticism from
constituencies in states such as Michigan and North Carolina,
where benefit corporation legislation failed to pass on the
grounds that these corporations "create a false dichotomy be-
tween 'good' and 'bad' business." 122
B. Transparency
In the Model legislation, a "third-party standard" is defined
as "a recognized standard for defining, reporting and assessing
overall corporate social and environmental performance." 123
Currently, not all state benefit corporation statutes require re-
starter-becomes-a-public-benefit-corporation-so-what/ [https://perma.cc/
974M-TNRC].
120 "Greenwashing" describes the "deceptive use of green marketing which
promotes a misleading perception that a company's policies, practices, products
or services are environmentally friendly." Devika Kewalramani & Richard J.
Sobelsohn, "Greenwashing": Deceptive Business Claims of "Eco-FrIendliness",
FORBES (Mar. 20, 2012, 12:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2012/
03/20/greenwashing-deceptive-business-claims-of-eco-friendliness/ [https://
perma.cc/W53Q-E5Z8]. See also Christopher Helman, EconMobil: Green Com-
pany of the Year, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2009, 12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/2009/0824/energy-oil-exxonmobil-green-company-of-year.html [https://
perma.cc/J4G7-VGWf] (describing ExxonMobil's approach to going green); Col-
leen Haight, The Problem with Fair Trade Coffee, STAN. SOC. INNOVATloN REv. (Sum-
mer 2011), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/the-problem with-fairtradecoffee
[https://perma.cc/MY5G-BMET] (noting uneven economic advantages for fair
trade coffee).
121 About Greenwashing, GREENWASHING INDEx, http://greenwashingindex.
com/about-greenwashing/ [https://perma.cc/8AF3-V99L].
122 Plerhoples, supra note 35, at 249 (citation omitted).
123 MBCL, supra note 39, § 102.
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view by a third party.1 2 4 For instance, in Delaware, the bien-
nial benefit report does not need to be assessed by a third
party.125 Although most states have based their benefit corpo-
ration legislation on the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation,
the discrepancies amongst the states can be problematic, espe-
cially because most courts look to Delaware corporate law for
guidance.1 2 6
There is speculation as to why the obligation for third-party
review was not included in states such as Delaware. For exam-
ple, some have argued that mandatory third-party review
would be too financially burdensome on benefit corporations
and that it would place benefit corporations at a financial dis-
advantage, particularly when their more traditional for-profit
counterparts are not required to undergo regular review.1 2 7
Additionally, there are already sufficient incentives for benefit
corporations to report information accurately because benefit
corporations are subject to lawsuits for fraud.1 28 Law profes-
sors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider also warn against
mandated disclosure, arguing that the costs of such provisions
typically far outweigh the benefits.1 2 9
Moreover, benefit corporations appear to largely evade the
model legislation's requirement of publishing annual reports
and making them available to the public. 3 0 In a study under-
taken by Assistant Professor J. Haskell Murray at Belmont
University, Massey College, results showed that only eight of
the one hundred active benefit corporations in 2012 from Cali-
fornia, Hawaii, New York, and Virginia had made a benefit cor-
poration report available to the public. 1 3 These "abysmal"
statistics (less than 10%), and the fact that some of the corpo-
rations even lacked a website, support the fear that benefit
124 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(a)(c)(3) (2017).
125 See id.
126 See Matthew R. Loecker, Social Entrepreneurship and Public Benefit Corpo
rations, MORSE BARNES-BROWN PENDLETON (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.mbbp.com/
news/social-entrepreneurship-and-public-benefit-corporation [https://
perma.c/3DP9-CAAw] (contrasting Delaware's public benefit corporation law
with Massachusetts's law).
127 See Anna R. Kimbrell, Note, Benefit Corporation Legislation: An Opportunity
for Kansas to Welcome Social Enterprises, 62 KAN. L. REV. 549, 571 (2013) (stating
that the advantages of a benefit corporation's good reputation may be offset by the
higher transaction costs of mandatory reporting standards).
128 See id. at 566 (stating that existing corporate law already provides protec-
tion for misrepresentation and fraud in the case of benefit corporations).
129 See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNow: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 182-83 (2014).
130 Murray, supra note 45, at 34-35.
131 Id.
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corporations will easily evade their socially responsible com-
mitments.1 3 2 The ambiguity in the statutory language regard-
ing third-party review and the lack of enforcement of
publishing requirements detracts from the stated goal of bene-
fit corporations to encourage transparency.13 3 Without univer-
sal mandatory third-party review, the public cannot be sure
that benefit reports issued by companies are accurate and
complete.1 3 4
C. Efficiency
An additional concern involves the lack of incentives that
benefit corporations currently have to pursue their stated so-
cial missions as efficiently as possible. Unlike philanthropic
organizations, benefit corporations are not necessarily out-
come-oriented; they are not under an obligation to "pursue
evidence-based strategies" to "achieve clearly defined goals."13 5
Moreover, benefit corporations, unlike non-profit organiza-
tions, are not given federal tax benefits.1 3 6 These factors un-
doubtedly lower the economic incentive for benefit corporations
to realize their stated goals as quickly and effectively as
possible.
Additionally, there is doubt as to whether benefit corpora-
tions will pursue social missions more efficiently than non-
profit organizations. 17 There is a concern that benefit corpo-
rations will crowd out the non-profit market and lead to an
overall decrease in the amount of socially beneficial activity.' 3 8
This effect could potentially result from a combination of finan-
cial and non-financial business advantages that benefit corpo-
rations enjoy that non-profits do not. As previously mentioned,
benefit corporations are at a significant advantage when secur-
132 Id. at 36.
133 Legal FAQS, supra note 3.
134 See Jeremy Nicholls, People, Power and Accountability, STAN. SOC. INNOVA-
TION REV. (June 23, 2014), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/people-power
and accountability [https://perma.cc/5PTW-WSZH].
135 Paul Brest, A Decade of Outcome-Oriented Philanthropy, STAN. Soc. INNOVA-
TION REV., 42 (Spring 2012), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/a decade ofout
come oriented-philanthropy [https://perma.ce/N9NV-5DZ2] (explaining how
"outcome-oriented" is equivalent to "result-oriented" in philanthropy).
136 Gomez, supra note 54.
137 See Jill R. Horwitz & Rachel Culley, Profits v. Purpose: Hybrid Companies
and the Charitable Dollar 21 (Univ. of Mich. Scholarship Repository, Law & Econ.
Working Papers, Paper No. 48, 2014), http://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/view
content.cgi?article= 1158&context=law econ current [https://perma.cc/6BB5-
V8PN] (discussing the risks hybrid entities pose to nonprofit organizations).
138 Jic
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ing capital to finance the organization.13 9 Additionally, the IRS
limits pay to employees of charitable organizations to "reasona-
ble" compensation,1 4 0 which may draw talent away from non-
profit organizations and towards benefit corporations. With
respect to non-financial advantages, benefit corporations have
more freedom to pay to attract and retain talent, are not re-
quired to make executive compensation information available
to the public, and are permitted to lobby and accept political
campaign donations.141
D. Ambiguity
Arguably, the most problematic aspect of the benefit corpo-
ration is the ambiguity in how strictly the court should enforce
a company's stated social mission.1 4 2 The law is faced with the
challenge of regulating benefit corporations in a way that
strikes a delicate balance between protecting the shareholder's
expectations with regards to social benefits and protecting the
director's authority to make sound business judgments. 14
Some scholars argue that directors of benefit corporations
should have less authority than directors of traditional for-
profit corporations. '4 For example, Phil Peters, co-chair of the
Corporation Committee of the California Bar, believes that ben-
efit corporations give directors "unnecessarily broad discretion
at the expense of shareholders."145 Similarly, Frank Easter-
brook and Daniel Fischel have stated that "a manager told to
serve two masters (a little for the equity holders, a little for the
community) has been freed of both and is answerable to
neither."' 46
Currently, shareholders have the right to sue directors of
benefit corporations for failing to uphold their socially benefi-
cial commitments in an action called a benefit enforcement
139 See supra subpart II.A.
140 Plerhoples, supra note 109, at 565.
141 Lofft, Maniar, & Rosenberg, supra note 63, at 5.
142 See Eric Camm, Benefit Enforcement Proceedings for the Benefit Corpora-
tion-What Are They and How Will They Work?, APEX L. GROUP (Apr. 2, 2012),
http://apexlg.com/benefit-enforcement-proceedings-for-the-benefit-corporation-
what-are-they-and-how-wll-they-work/ [https://perma.cc/TJ4M-MZA3].
143 See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Social Enterprise as Commitment: A Roadmap, 48
WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 89, 95 (2015).
144 See, e.g., Leslie Brokaw, The "Benefit Corporation" Movement, MIT SLOAN
MGMr. REV. (Nov. 28, 2012), http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-benefit-cor-
poration-movement/ (https://perma.cc/DF69-9WD3] (discussing the view that
benefit corporations grant managers too much authority).
145 Id.
146 FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CORPORATE LAw 38 (1991).
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proceeding.' 4 7 The benefit corporation also provides that "in
the absence of applicable case law, director decisions will be
treated with similar deference to that afforded other business
judgments under current law."' 48 In Part IV, I propose an al-
ternative to allowing a blanket business judgment rule to apply
in such cases.
IV
PROPOSED SOLUTION
A benefit corporation has yet to be sued in a benefit en-
forcement proceeding for breaching a duty to fulfill a stated
mission.1 4 9 There is, however, a need for clarity regarding the
extent to which directors of benefit corporations are legally al-
lowed to prioritize stakeholder interests above maximizing
share value.15 0 As mentioned earlier, there is little "guidance
as to how boards with dual responsibilities to shareholders and
other constituencies should balance competing interests."15 1
There have been a number of proposed solutions to this
issue, ranging from a call for "clear and enforceable" govern-
ment regulations' 5 2 to the creation of a regulatory board.15 3
The question remains: when a Benefit Corporation is sued for
failing to uphold a stated social mission, how should the court
determine liability? In such a case, I propose that whether or
not the court should impose liability should be a factor of:
(Kind of Benefit) (Profit) (Time)
(Time Lag of Benefit)
147 See Surowiecki, supra note 115 (discussing shareholders' rights to sue a
benefit corporation); Camm, supra note 142 (calling such a proceeding a "benefit
enforcement proceeding").
148 FAQ, supra note 60.
149 Camm, supra note 142 (discussing possible outcomes of a benefit enforce-
ment proceeding if one were to occur).
150 See CIARK & VRANKA, supra note 26, at 24.
151 Stephen I. Glover et al., A Corporate Paradigm Shift: Public Benefit Corpora-
tions, GIBSON DUNN (Aug. 9, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/
documents/Corporate-Paradigm-Shift-Public-Benefit-Corporations.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/8MUQ-8H29].
152 This solution has been proposed by Professor Kent Greenfield at Boston
College Law School. Brokaw, supra note 144 (quoting Ben Schreckinger, Virtue
Inc., Bos. GLOBE (Nov. 25, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/11/
25/virtue-inc/sMNhRcOIgZOrqjpLTALrN/story.html [https://perma.cc/5ZD7-
GW25]).
153 See Munch, supra note 56, at 191 (stating that directors "need either
incentives or requirements to keep pressure on them and to help ensure that they
do not fall back to using traditional, profit-focused frames in their decision mak-
ing." This can be accomplished "by instituting new internal policies, procedures,
and structures.").
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In the above model, the "Kind of Benefit" refers to the
nature and scale of the social benefit that the organization
claims to pursue. For example, missions geared towards im-
proving human health, safety, and rights would be given a
higher value than missions geared towards providing func-
tional and affordable fashion accessories to the public. Next,
"Profit" refers to the average net positive income that a benefit
corporation has accumulated since the time of its incorpora-
tion as a benefit corporation. The larger the amount of profit,
the higher the value given to this factor should be. Similarly,
the "Time" factor refers to the amount of time that the organi-
zation has been incorporated as a benefit corporation. Ac-
cordingly, benefit corporations incorporated for a longer
amount of time in years should be given a higher value of
"Time." Finally, "Time Lag of Benefit" refers to length of time
needed for the stated benefit to be realizable. If the benefit is
of a nature that requires a significant passage of time (for
example, improving air quality in a certain region), this factor
would be given a high value.
In practice, the court would not assign specific numerical
values to each of these factors. Rather, it would weigh the
factors relative to each other. For example, consider Company
A, a benefit corporation faced with a benefit enforcement pro-
ceeding for failing to pursue its stated social mission. Com-
pany A, who has claimed to pursue a kind of benefit that is
largely pertinent to human health and safety, has realized sig-
nificant profits over the last ten years, 1 5 4 and has been incor-
porated as a benefit corporation for a period of time far longer
than the amount of time it would take to realize the stated
benefit. Using the equation above, the weight of the numerator
would far exceed that of the denominator. In such a case, the
court should use a strict standard of review, where the burden
of proof would fall on the directors of Company A, who are
seeking to avoid liability, to show that their decision making
was based on careful examination of the company's impact on
its stated social mission (by use of rigorous third-party audits,
for instance).
If, however, Company A in the above example- had claimed
a benefit that required a significant time lag before the benefit
was realizable, all other factors remaining equal, the weight of
the denominator would be more or less equivalent to that of the
numerator in the above equation. In such a case, the court
should use an intermediate standard of review, where the di-
154 Note that at the time this note was written, no Benefit Corporation had
existed for more than seven years. See Glover et al., supra note 151.
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rectors of Corporation A would still have the burden of proof,
but would only have to demonstrate that the board reasonably
considered its stated social mission in the decision-making
process.
In a final example, consider Company B, which claims a
small-scale benefit, has not yet realized profit, has only been a
benefit corporation for one year, and claims a benefit that re-
quires a significant passage of time. In such a case, the de-
nominator of the equation would outweigh the numerator.
Thus, using this model, the court would use a low level of
scrutiny or the business judglent rule. As such, the court
would presume that the directors of Corporation B have taken
the stated social mission into account before making their bus-
iness decisions.
The proposed method of evaluating liability provides a
number of benefits. First, the model differentiates between
general public benefits that are very important (such as pro-
tecting human health, safety, and rights) from those that are
less vital. The equation works in a way that holds companies
claiming to undertake human health and safety missions to a
higher standard of accountability than companies claiming to
promote a smaller-scale benefit. A second benefit is that this
model encourages companies to undergo thorough and regular
audits without imposing an absolute requirement for audits,
which can be financially burdensome for companies that are
newly incorporated and have not yet been able to realize prof-
its; the more rigorous and frequent the third-party audit, the
more likely the court will find that the directors took the appro-
priate care to consider the stated social mission of the benefit
corporation. Third, incorporating time as a factor encourages
efficiency: the longer the organization has been a benefit corpo-
ration, the higher the expectation that it has furthered its
stated social mission. Finally, the proposed model provides
guidance on what shareholders and directors should expect
when a benefit enforcement proceeding is brought in court,
which could lead to less litigation and more out-of-court dis-
pute resolution.
In spite of the proposed model's benefits, there are a num-
ber of potential limitations. First, there is the argument that
shareholders are unlikely to bring suit because money dam-
ages are not awarded in benefit enforcement proceedings and
thus shareholders have no economic incentive to sue. 15 5 I ar-
155 See Kyle Westaway & Dirk Sampselle, The Benefit Corporation: An Eco-
nomic Analysis with Recommendations to Courts, Boards, and Legislatures, 62
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gue that it is possible that a social mission will be important
enough to shareholders that they will desire to bring suit on
behalf of that mission.15 6 As one author states, "[Als long as
benefit incorporation remains voluntary, benefit corporations
will attract investors who believe in the concept of 'shareholder
responsibilty." 5 7
Next, benefit corporations are still young (the first benefit
corporation legislation was passed in 2010), 15s so at this point
in time, applying this model will result in a situation where the
business judgment rule will most likely apply. However, in
time, benefit corporations will have existed long enough for the
"Time" factor of the equation to no longer be dispositive.
Another argument is that because this model imposes
greater accountability on benefit corporations attempting to
pursue human health and safety-related missions, there could
be a disincentive for corporations to pursue such goals. I argue
that this will not be the case, as there will continue to be
entrepreneurs primarily motivated by such important social
missions. What is more, the imposition of greater accountabil-
ity could function as an advantage because benefit corpora-
tions will be less likely to overstate their social missions. In
other words, it would lower the risk of "greenwashing" among
companies.
Although monetary awards are not available in benefit en-
forcement proceedings, a party bringing such an action will
likely seek other remedies, such as restructuring of the corpo-
ration, replacement of directors running the Benefit Corpora-
tion, or an injunction.' 5 9 While the proposed model is by no
means exact, it will provide a simple guideline for courts when
assessing whether or not to grant one of the aforementioned
remedies. Accordingly, having such a guideline in place will
EMORY L.J. 999, 1040-41 (2013) (stating that it is "not clear that there will be any
economic incentive for the shareholders to bring suit to enforce the directors'
duties . . . . most statutes declare that there will not be a monetary award
available for directors' failure to create a public benefit" (footnote omitted)).
156 See, e.g., Ian Kanig, Note, Sustainable Capitalism Through the Benefit Cor-
poration: Enforcing the Procedural Duty of Consideration to Protect Non-Share-
holder Interests, 64 HAsTINGs L.J. 863, 902-03 (2013) (arguing for the likelihood
that at least one shareholder would be willing to "engage in a benefit enforcement
proceeding against the board of directors out of concern for both her long-term
investment and the provision of positive externalities").
157 Id. (quoting Ian B. Lee, Corporate Law, Profit Maximization, and the "Re-
sponsible" Shareholder, 10 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 31 passim (2005)).
158 State by State Status, supra note 19.
159 See Camm, supra note 142.
20 181] 1099
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
mitigate the uncertainty of how courts will assess liability in
benefit enforcement proceedings in the future.
CONCLUSION
The widespread legal recognition of the benefit corporation
is a positive step towards improving the social impacts that
businesses have on their communities and increasing overall
social utility. Rather than having a negative impact on non-
profits, legal recognition of mission-driven corporations will en-
hance the larger social movement towards social conscien-
tiousness. With the weight of corporate law promoting the
proliferation of benefit corporations and other socially respon-
sible business entities, society will benefit from the channeling
of corporate resources and talent into efforts such as environ-
mental conservation, community building, advocating for gen-
der equality, enhancing worker's rights, and promoting
economic opportunities for poorer communities. Current
guidelines, however, lack the clarity needed to guide business
leaders in their managerial capacities. In time and with the
appropriate benefit enforcement proceeding guidelines in
place, benefit corporations will be able to move forward with
confidence in the pursuit of groundbreaking social change.
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